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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
9 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 27  
(As of 5:00 P.M. EST)

NVN Air Developments

[redacted]

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2. The transfer of eight IL-14's from the DRV reserve airfield at Yunnani in south China to Hanoi on the 6th, and a mission this far south on the night of the 7th, indicates that this was an urgent high priority mission involving either cargo and/or personnel. The A Shau Valley is a major logistic base for NVA operations in northern South Vietnam.

Attack Preparations Summarized

3. There are a number of indications that the Communists may be preparing for a new phase of attacks in South Vietnam, possibly within the next few days. Evidence of this is seen in the positioning near key targets of so far uncommitted enemy units, [redacted]

[redacted]

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4. North Vietnamese forces all along the Demilitarized Zone appear to be in an offensive posture. Major concentrations of enemy forces have also been detected just south of Da Nang and around Dak To in the central highlands. [redacted]

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5. To the South, elements of the North Vietnamese 7th, and the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Divisions are operating some distances from their normal base areas and are in a position to strike key US installations in central III Corps or to serve as a reserve force against Saigon.

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[redacted]

6. A number of enemy prisoners and documents captured since late fall have indicated that the "winter-spring" offensive would have a second phase lasting through March. Several prisoners taken in the recent fighting have claimed that there would be follow up attacks within a week or 10 days.

[redacted]

Communist Objectives

8. Interrogation of prisoners captured in the recent Viet Cong attacks on populated centers continues to indicate that most of these soldiers actually believed that their attacks could succeed, that failures would be minimal, and that these initial efforts would be followed up by similar attacks until the Communists had eventually gained full control.

9. The latest group of Viet Cong prisoners to contribute to this picture of Communist intent was captured in the battle of Pleiku city. Many of these men were hardcore Communist party members of long term standing and one was a member of the party's provincial committee. They report that their pre-attack indoctrination was virtually identical with current Communist propaganda claims. They say they believed that the population would rise up in support of their attack. They were under instructions to destroy the local GVN administrative structure and

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to replace it with a coalition of prominent local personalities and groups in cooperation with local Front representatives.

10. The reasons they gave for such optimistic anticipation of military success involved a belief that only one third of the Communist forces had been committed to the initial attacks and that the remaining two-thirds would be sent in later if the initial attack failed. The soldiers were also enthusiastic about recent issues of large quantities of new, foreign-made weapons.

11. It is important to observe in assessing probable future Communist strategy in the war, [REDACTED] that the Viet Cong would not be ready to quit, even in the event the attacks all failed. They all agreed that the Front would continue both the military and political aspects of the struggle, that the "Liberation Army" would continue to be strengthened in both numbers and firepower, and that the cities would be struck again. [REDACTED] that even large personnel losses would not dampen Communist ambitions. Local force losses, he felt, would be especially easy to recoup. He claimed that the Front simply would not admit or disseminate information on the extent of such losses.

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